![]() ![]() "A subsequent engineering review of the conditions that existed at the time determined that, based on area temperature response, any impact on ventilation flows into and out of the `B' charging pump cubicle did not generate an observable change in the temperature trend. "The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), via an 8-hour report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat. * * * RETRACTION ON AT 1400 EDT FROM JAMES KELLY TO JOHN RUSSELL* * * This event did not impact Millstone Unit 2. Repairs and investigation continue on the 'B' train ECCS damper. "Subsequently, the 'A' train of service water was restored to operable at 0548 on. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), '.' This configuration resulted in the possibility that the 'A' train of ECCS would not have been available to fulfill its design function under all postulated accident conditions. At the time of this event, the 'A' train of service water was already inoperable due to planned maintenance on a breaker that would have prevented an 'A' service water valve powered from this breaker from closing on a safety signal. "At 0449 on, Millstone Unit 3 declared the 'B' train of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) inoperable due to a degraded damper associated with the ventilation support system for the 'B' charging pump. The following information was provided by the licensee via email: EN Revision Text: ECCS POTENTIALLY INOPERABLE ![]()
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